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Introduction
The reading of Dangerous Diplomacy, by the historian and theolo-
gian Theo Tshuy, prompts refl ections on the human rights shift from 
extra-legal ‘individualism’ to ‘legal institutionalisation’, due to the post 
World War II redefi ned jus cogens principle of puena erga omnes1 and just 
interventions. While the prime focus during World War II was dangerous 
rescue operations conducted by ‘Righteous Gentiles’ like the Swiss Buda-
pest Consul Carl Lutz and his remarkable wife Gertrud, the focus today 
has changed to preventive,2 protective3 and quiet diplomacy4 under the 
auspices of the UN, or ultimately by force, engaging UN member states 
or regional organisations like NATO.5 The righteous state and interna-
tional authorities back up the moral and ethical righteous human. Thus, 
the fi ctitious justifi cation of humanitarian intervention in the 1970s by 
* Professor of law at the University of Tromsø (NFH), Norway.
1  See for instance the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) art 33.
2  Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 
Peace-keeping (UN, New York 1992). See also Kuman Rupesinghe’s proposal of ‘Offi ce for 
Preventive Diplomacy’ in Dietrich Fisher (ed), Nonmilitary Aspects of Security: A Systems 
Approach (UN Institute for Disarmament Research 1993) chapter 5. 
3  Robert Johansen, ‘Reforming the United Nations to Eliminate War’ (1994) 4 (2) Transna-
tional Law and Contemporary Problems 455-502.
4  David Shorr, ‘United Nations Reform in Context’ (February 2006) The Stanley Foundation 
Policy Analysis Brief, 5.
5  Use of force is restricted, as indicated in the 1907 Convention on the Peaceful Resolu-
tion of International Confl icts, the 1928 Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an 
Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact), and the Charter of the United Nations 
art 33.
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reason of self-defence6 (UN Charter Article 51)7 was, at the end of the mil-
lennium, seen as legally valid for the purpose of humanitarian invasion.8 
Its justifi cation is to be found at the intersection of a modifi ed princi-
ple of national sovereignty and the redefi ned principle of universality, ie 
the growing international limitations on people’s right to self-determina-
tion.9
A comprehensive, institutionalised system of human rights and uni-
versal jurisdiction is underway.10 The breakthrough is in the demand for 
a brand-new version of the 1823 US Monroe Doctrine,11 this time in the 
hands of supra-national institutions, not in the hands of national states, 
cf the Bush Doctrine: ‘Unilaterally if we can, multilaterally if we must’.12 
As a result, human rights defenders are equipped with a strong interfer-
ence right as lex superior to the principle of sovereignty.
My refl ections on the latest jurisdictional developments in human 
rights are based on a reading of Dangerous Diplomacy, which recounts 
the story of Gertrud and Carl Lutz who, faced with humans at risk, let the 
Swiss diplomatic code and etiquette count, but made Western humanism, 
ethics and religious conviction (p 28) decide. This fascinating book brings 
to the forefront interesting puzzles of modern society. One is the story of 
6  For an analysis of the right to anticipatory self-defense, and pre-emptive strike, see Pe-
ter Ørebech, ‘“Anticipatory self-defense”: A pivotal thing in the case of Afghanistan’ (under 
preparation) 7.
7  Such as the 1971 Indian invasion of Bangladesh and the 1979 Tanzanian invasion of 
Uganda. See United Kingdom Foreign Offi ce Policy Document no 18, reprinted in Bertram S 
Brown, ‘The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction’ (2001) 35 New England Law Review 
383, 388. While the Bush administration presumes that the non UN acknowledged USA-led 
Iraq invasion is valid self defence, infl uential US legal scientists challenge that conclusion. 
See, amongst others, Rex J Zedalis, ‘Circumstances Justifying Pre-emptive Self-Defence: 
Thoughts Prompted by the Military Action Against Iraq’ (2005) 74 Nordic Journal of Inter-
national Law 209-230. For a more general approach to how legal texts ‘do more to legitimate 
than restrain violence’, see David Kennedy, ‘Modern War and Modern Law’ (2007) 16 Min-
nesota Journal of International Law 493.
8  As was the NATO bombing of Serbia during the 80 days war of 1999. See White House 
spokesman Joe Lockhart who claimed that NATO’s bombing objective was to ‘stop the killing 
and achieve a durable peace’ (The Associated Press, March 24, 1999). 
9  Corfu Channel [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 22: elementary considerations of humanity are among 
the general and recognized principles of international law. Barcelona Traction [1970] ICJ 
Rep 3, 23: The function of the court is ‘to confi rm and endorse the most elementary prin-
ciples of morality’. Thus, human rights are among the maxims that form the national sov-
ereignty framework.
10  Jonathan  I  Charney, ‘Universal International Law’ (1993) 87 AJIL 529;  Antti Korkeaki-
vi, ‘Consequences of “Higher” International Law: Evaluating Crimes of State and Erga 
Omnes’ (1996) 2 JILS 81. 
11  See Donald Marquand Dozer (ed), The Monroe Doctrine: Its Modern Signifi cance (Alfred A 
Knopf, New York 1965).
12  See Richard K Betts, ‘The political support system for American primacy’ (2005) 81 (1) 
International Affairs 1, 2. 
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the decline of the 1648 Constitutio Westphalica, the axiom of sovereignty 
(‘Landeshoheit’) and non-intervention initiated by the ‘fi rst truly Europe-
an settlement in history,’13 which came under pressure from a ‘modifi ed 
version of the Monroe Doctrine’. 
Another is the transformation of purely moral, ethical and religious 
principles of human dignity into law. The obligation to resist military or-
ders was fuelled by the 1945-1946 Nuremberg Trial.14 The court imposed 
on the prosecuted Nazi leaders both basic moral and ethical concerns 
and thereby transformed extralegal principles of righteous and moral be-
haviour into ‘law’. The tribunal’s ruling (‘law in action’15) ‘to confi rm and 
endorse the most elementary principles of morality’16 produced binding 
legal principles.17 
The Dangerous Diplomacy of individual responsibility 
All human beings bear responsibility for their own decisions and 
behaviour. Clearly, not all accept that responsibility. If accepted, how-
ever, no obligation seems to be more compelling than inter partes moral 
commitments.18 Strictly order-oriented behaviour is insuffi cient. Every 
individual suffers from the obligation to resist atrocities:  
Rather, his [Keitel’s] defence relies on the fact that he is a soldier, 
and on the doctrine of ‘superior orders,’ prohibited by Article 8 of 
the Charter [Nuremberg Court Charter Article 8: ‘The fact that the 
Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a supe-
rior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered 
in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice 
so requires’] as a defense. There is nothing in mitigation. Superior 
orders, even to a soldier, cannot be considered in mitigation where 
crimes as shocking and extensive have been committed consciously, 
ruthlessly and without military excuse or justifi cation.19 
13  G. Pagès, The Thirty Years War 1618-1648 (Harper & Row, New York 1970) 228, cf 
Chapter IX.
14  See the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of 
the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal (8 August 
1945).
15  Roscoe Pound, Law and Morals (Chapel Hill 1926) 80.
16  Barcelona Traction (n 9) 23.
17  The UN subsequently confi rmed the ruling. See UNGA, Affi rmation of the Principles of 
International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, (11 December 
1945) UNGA Res 95(1) UN Doc A/236 (1946) 1144.
18  This concept is well captured in the fi lm of Patrice LeConte, ‘La veuve du Saint-Pierre’.
19  Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War 
Criminals (1945-46), against the Chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces, 
Admiral Keitel.
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By rescuing 62,000 Jews from the Nazis during World War II, the 
Lutz couple took such individual responsibility.20 Tschuy asserts that 
no single person is too insignifi cant to undertake extraordinary acts of 
compassion and courage (cf the brave Hungarian Police Captain Kalman 
Horvath (p. 99) and the Romanian diplomat Florian Manoliou (p 142)). 
Individuals are capable of principled, selfl ess action. As decent humans, 
the Lutzes’ only choice was to save innocent lives, irrespective of whether 
this represented disobedience to diplomatic protocols: ‘Were they [the 
refugees] not like Lazarus, the poor man on the steps, and was he [Lutz] 
not to them like the rich man?’ (p 41). The Lutzes took responsibility far 
beyond diplomatic obligations. 
Righteous treatment of others requires personal high moral stand-
ards. Religious beliefs alone do not count for decent human behaviour. 
The Holocaust that Lutz the Methodist (‘in his youthful enthusiasm he 
wanted Jesus to guide his life’ (p 27)) fought so hard against was tacitly 
supported by the Hungarian Catholic Church (cf leader Cardinal Jusz-
titian Serédi (p 114)), at least until August 1944 (p 164). Obviously, re-
ligion may mandate decency, but personal ethical conviction determines 
personal choices.
In a situation of confl icting moral and legal norms, individuals are 
faced with impossible choices. Only the strongest proselytes and clever-
est strategists survive in such a climate. Lutz did so; he transgressed 
diplomatic codes and etiquette, which made the Swiss Foreign Ministry 
call him before an investigating judge (p 260). Where ‘diplomatic cus-
tom [clashed] with human considerations’ (p 16) Lutz took a disobedient 
role similar to the one that the post-war Court of Nuremberg urged Nazi 
criminals to take. Practising (in time of war) the emerging conventional 
protection of the ‘right to life’, Lutz met what later became the expecta-
tions of Article 3 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He 
naturally responded in a humane manner, confronted as he was with 
individual and family tragedies at close hand (‘it was he who had to look 
into the faces that were distorted by fear, day after day’ (p 68)). His only 
choice was to issue Swiss ‘Schutzbriefe’ to Jews at risk, granting Swiss 
immunity (p 67) and making arrangements for safe rescue abroad. The 
magical limit of 8,000 protection letters (negotiated with the Hungarian 
and German authorities) was, however, far exceeded by Lutz’s practice of 
issuing duplicate protection letters, numbered below 8,001.  The author 
estimates that Lutz, in total, issued approximately 80,000 ‘Schutzbriefe’ 
(p 89). Through this tactic, 62,000 Jews were rescued. 
20  Another example of a ‘righteous human’ is the Czech Sudeten-German industrialist and 
Nazi member Oskar Schindler, in Stephen Spielberg’s fi lm, ‘Schindler’s List,’ who managed 
to rescue approximately 6,000 Polish Jews.
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The only public response Lutz received after the war was a formal 
reprimand! In 1995, twenty years after Lutz’s death, the Swiss Federal 
Government offi cially apologised for its long neglect, declaring Carl Lutz 
to be one of the outstanding citizens in the nation’s history (Foreword by 
Simon Wiesenthal p xii). Faced with bureaucratic condemnation and loss 
of professional credibility, few people choose the ethical option that con-
fl icts with legal provisions.  Public servants with a weaker character than 
Carl Lutz will surely back off. A viable system of human rights cannot 
survive under such harsh conditions. Only through the backing of codifi -
cation, surveillance and control (‘legal institutionalisation’) will individual 
morals succeed. In a world of politically initiated atrocities, individual 
responsibility and plain righteousness are insuffi cient. 
Immoral and unethical behaviour on display 
Another insight from the book is that the Nazis preferred to pursue 
their cause in secret. No effort was spared to disguise their atrocities. 
Confronted with the ‘rumours’, SS leaders vehemently rejected the geno-
cide accusations as ‘wild imagination’ (p 133). Jewish leaders misinter-
preted the situation and chose inappropriate strategies such as coop-
eration with the Nazis and buy-out schemes to rescue endangered Jews 
from death camps (see the harsh criticism of Reszö Kasztner (pp 84 and 
133) and the Jewish Council of Hungary (p 80)). By sending the Ausch-
witz Protocols, written by the Slovak Jews Rudolf Vrba and Josef Lanik 
who miraculously escaped the death camp, to the Jewish-born Salva-
doran Consulate Administrator in Switzerland, George Mandel-Mantello, 
Lutz helped to break the silence and expose the Nazi criminal offences. 
Mandel-Mantello spread the news so that ‘the spirit released …could not 
be squeezed back into the bottle again’ (p 142). Under the scrutiny of a 
free press and world opinion, fear of universal outrage would possibly 
hold back even the worst mass murderer from pursuing his purposes. 
The aftermath of this publication was the miraculous end to Jewish de-
portation with the decree of 8 July 1944 of the Hungarian regent, Nicolas 
Horthy, which outraged Adolf Eichmann and the German Ambassador to 
Hungary, Edmund Veesenmayer (p 147). 
The importance of reliable information cannot be underestimated; 
some say that the ‘the pen is mightier than the sword’. Clearly, a free 
press and freedom of expression are well provided for under Article 19 of 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the corresponding 
principles enumerated in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Even more important to guarantee favourable conditions 
for the operation of the mass media is the 1978 Declaration on Fun-
damental Principles concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to 
Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion 
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of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement 
to War.21 Even though openness of governance is provided, one cannot do 
without a free and independent press. 
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it
Another image that Dangerous Diplomacy leaves with the reader is 
that life experience imprints unbreakable patterns on legal development. 
Before World War II, the racially persecuted enjoyed no conventional pro-
tection. The book provides insight into the historic events that ‘fuelled 
the engine’ of the 1948 Human Rights Declaration, the 1948 Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide 
Convention),22 the 1949 Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, 
and the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. These experiences 
explain why Article 1 of the Declaration reads ‘All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights’ and Article 2 ‘Everyone is entitled to 
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinc-
tion of any kind, such as race…social origin… birth or other status.’ 
One lesson of World War II is to expose the risk run in placing one’s 
trust in ‘righteous gentiles’ worldwide. Even if the human spirit is good, 
we must recall that human commitments are weak. ‘I concur with Hob-
bes in assuming that no bottom-up mechanism of order is capable of 
preventing war under anarchy.’23 This warning is displayed under human 
rights violations as well. Righteous humans need strong institutional 
support to survive in a society ignorant of human rights.24  
Towards preventive and protective diplomacy under the auspices 
of the UN
Dangerous Diplomacy demonstrates that legislation and confl ict 
resolution or prosecution are only one step in criminal procedure. Just 
implementation through enforcement is also important, as illustrated by 
21  UNESCO General Conference (22 November 1978) 20th session, Paris; UNESCO’s Stan-
dard-Setting Instruments (1994) IV C. 
22  The convention is displayed by the International Court of Justice (Croatia v. Yugoslavia). 
On 2 July 1999 the Republic of Croatia instituted proceedings before the Court against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention alleged to 
have been committed between 1991 and 1995. Cf 1951 ICJ 15, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 
1951: Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide.
23  Raino Malnes, The Hobbesian Theory of International Confl ict (Scandinavian University 
Press 1993) 36. See also David Fisher, ‘The Ethics of Intervention and the Former Yugosla-
via’ in Roger Williamson (ed), Some Corner of a Foreign Field (Basingstoke 1998) 166-173.
24  As stated by Charlotte Bunch at the Harvard Human Rights Journal Spring Conference 
on UN Reform and Human Rights (25 February 2006), conceptualising and organising for 
human rights is the alpha & omega in the struggle for human rights protection. 
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the post-war scandalous pressure by the US High Commissioner for Ger-
many, John McCloy, to pardon Veesenmayer from a mild 20-year prison 
sentence after having served only 5 years. In the fi ght against commu-
nism, no sacrifi ce of Jewish lives was too nasty. Veesenmayer had ‘suc-
ceeded in using this new spirit to reduce the enormity of his crime’ (p 
216). 
To achieve the goal of viable human rights protection, a comprehen-
sive system of human rights institutions is needed, including interna-
tionally recognised lawmakers, direct law applicability (monistic interna-
tional law obligations), and international institutions’ enforcement and 
confl ict resolution capabilities. The time has passed for the inadequate 
individual level responsibility of the early to mid 1900s. 
Since 1945, the establishment of international institutions with legal 
personality has been a major revolution in international law. The follow-
ing are some of the human rights highlights of the past half-century: fi rst 
and foremost is the evolving conventional human rights obligations, as 
mentioned above. Most instruments impose worldwide, universal obliga-
tions. These international instruments are supplemented by numerous 
UN human rights declarations and resolutions.25 The development and 
refi nement of human rights obligations by human rights institutions has 
set the agenda for the future. Due to the interpretative implementing and 
recommending power of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, new 
standards may be developed quite independently of the tyranny of nation 
states.26 The Security Council may adapt to these standards. An important 
illustration is the 1994 resolution emphasising that the practice of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ is a clear violation of international humanitarian law.27
Through the redefi nition of universality, the territorial scope of na-
tional legislative competency belongs to the exclusive autonomy of the 
state.28 For instance, Serbian breaches of US or Western European hu-
man rights principles in the now former Serbian province of Kosovo may 
be an offence against US and Western European law. While the princi-
ples of territory and nationality are well recognised, state competency 
beyond national boundaries vis-à-vis foreign citizens abroad traditionally 
25  The United Nations and Human Rights 1945-1995 (UN Blue Book Series vol VII, New 
York 1996).
26  Felice Gaer, ‘Reality Check: Human Rights NGOs Confront Governments at the UN’ 
in Thomas Weiss & Leon Gordenker (eds), NGOs, the UN and Global Governance (Boulder 
Colorado 1996).  
27  S/RES/941(23 September 1994).
28  The Danish professor of law Alf Ross did point to this option in the early 1950s: Alf Ross, 
Dansk Statsforfatningsret [Danish Constitutional Law]bd. I, 2nen udgave (Nyt nordisk for-
lag, København 1966)  18. See also Henrik Zahle, Dansk Statsforfatningsret [Danish Con-
stitutional Law] bd. I (Christian Ejlers’ Forlag, København 1989) 92.
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requires some sort of threat to state interests.29 The ‘Lotus-case’30 already 
shows that penal offences by foreigners abroad may be a breach of the 
criminal laws of third states. 
Secondly, human rights have been strengthened by the development 
of a permanent international system of human rights adjudication. The 
1950 European Human Rights Court, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia,31 and the Rwanda Tribunal32 followed the early 
ad hoc International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo. The 
new UN Human Rights Council33 and the International Criminal Court of 
Rome (ICC) 34 have fi nally joined in. 
Besides the new courts, the UN Human Rights Committee [now 
Council], according to the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Article 28, cf. article 41 and the Optional Protocol which install the com-
mittee with justifi cation competency, has a role in the adjudication of hu-
man rights.35 And even more important, the 1948 Genocide Convention 
obliges Member States Courts (art 1) to apply human rights principles. If 
not prosecuted ‘at home,’ an international penal tribunal (art 6) may pur-
sue the case against alleged violators. Whether external national courts 
may apply the genocide obligations to foreign citizens conducting atroci-
ties abroad is to be considered by these courts under the national ap-
plication of the principle of universality. The arrest and now terminated 
29  De lege lata several understandings have been advocated. For my purpose, no detailed 
discussion is necessary. See, however, Kenneth C Randall, ‘Universal Jurisdiction under 
International Law’ (1988) 66 Texas Law Review 785.
30  PCIJ Series A No 10 (1927).
31  Secretary Council resolution adopting the Statute of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (25 May 1993) S/RES 
827.   
32  Secretary Council resolution containing the decision to establish an international tri-
bunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda or in the territory of neighboring 
States (8 November 1994) S/RES 955.
33  For a short and informative overview, see Shorr (n 4) 5-6.
34  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998 (at present 27 Member 
States, in effect by the 60th ratifi cation): competency is limited to prosecution and conviction 
of persons for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Norway for instance has 
implemented the ICC obligations into domestic law. See Odelstingsproposisjon (Ot.prp.) nr. 
24 (1999-2000) Om ratifi kasjon av Roma-statutene til Den Internasjonale Strafferettsdom-
stol av  17 july 1998 [Ratifi cation of the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court] 
Chapter 2. Whether the court will enjoy jurisdiction over citizens of non-member states is 
discussed in Jordan J Paust, ‘The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction Over Non-Signatory Nationals’ 
(2000) 33 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1.
35  One illustration is the ICJ Order of 21 February 2001 in the case concerning the legal-
ity of use of force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), since the justifi cation of the NATO bombing is 
related to criminality against humanity. Similar cases are raised against other NATO coun-
tries that participated in the attacks.
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prosecution of Slobodan Miloševi  signalled that even a top state execu-
tive performing genocide or ‘ethnic cleansing’ is responsible towards the 
international societies of states.
Third, the protection of human rights is dependent on a proper sys-
tem of surveillance, control and enforcement. If military, paramilitary or 
police forces carry out atrocities against their own citizens, humanitarian 
intervention and enforcement is an international concern. Such interven-
tion is performed by UN-sanctioned military actions, or if the General As-
sembly or the Security Council fails to submit peacekeeping or military 
forces, by voluntary forces mounted by UN member states, if none of the 
Security Council States objects. An UN-external solution may be found 
under the auspices of regional or international defence agencies such as 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of 4 April 1949 as extend-
ed by the Act of 1997.36 It is said that NATO operations are ‘the logical 
extension of the principle of the Monroe Doctrine.’37 
NATO addresses the inability of the UN Security Council or the Gen-
eral Assembly to act properly, taking military responsibility for the hu-
man rights situation.38  Even some right of anticipatory action has been 
considered.39 Surely this ‘extension’ clashes with former understandings 
of the concept of sovereignty.40 However, there is a fi ne balance between 
the notion of sovereignty and the development of inalienable human 
rights. As stated by the Swedish Professor of law, Torsten Gihl:
International customary law is in constant development, and a uni-
lateral decision contrary to established practices, which in the fi rst 
run indicates a breach of international law, may simply be the signs 
of a new International Law.41
This is precisely what Professor Charney predicts: 
Perhaps the Kosovo intervention sets a precedent for the develop-
ment of new international law to protect human rights. After all, 
36  NATO, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and 
the Russian Federation , Paris, 27 May 1997.
37  The observation by Senator Tom Connolly as referred to by Thomas G Paterson, On Ev-
ery Front: The Making of the Cold War (Norton, New York 1979) 67.
38  Dick A Leurdijk, ‘Before and after Dayton: the UN and NATO in the former Yugoslavia’ in 
Thomas G Weiss (ed), Beyond UN Subcontracting (Basingstroke, 1998) 49-66.   
39  Christopher C Joyner & Anthony Clark Arend, ‘Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention: 
An Emerging Legal Norm?’ (1999/2000) 10 Journal of Legal Studies 27.
40  Klinton W Alexander, ‘NATO’s intervention in Kosovo: the Legal Case for Violating Yu-
goslavia’s National Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval’ (2000) 22 (3) 
Houston Journal of International Law 403-449.
41  Torsten Gihl, ‘Aktuella problem inom folkrätt och allmän rättslära’ [Present problems in 
international law and legal theory] (1953) Svensk juristtidning 356, 366. Author’s transla-
tion.
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general international law may change through breach of the current 
law and the development of new state practice and opinio juris sup-
porting the change.42 
Such a possible transformation was initiated by the new NATO pol-
icy of the late 1990s: 
NATO has expanded and will continue to expand its political func-
tions, and taken on new missions of peacekeeping and crisis man-
agement in support of the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).43  
In the case of Yugoslavia, NATO, despite the lack of any UN deci-
sions, pursued its ‘crisis management mission.’ This poses the question 
of whether tacit UN recognition is suffi cient. It also suggests that human 
rights defence is no longer the sole cause of toothless UN resolutions. 
Today, it may be asked whether the nation state sovereignty axiom of 
non-interference, coupled with incomplete international enforcement, is 
on the brink of failure when it comes to human rights defence. Some 
would say that fundamental human rights have become jus cogens, ie a 
non-derogative principle of customary international law.44 With support 
in the International Court of Justice 1951 advisory opinion, this is not a 
far-fl ung option. 
It may be asked whether the Constitutio Westphalica principle of sov-
ereignty is limited to states that implement, and do not breach, their 
international human rights obligations. This is not a remote wish, but 
seems to have strong support in US foreign policy, cf the 1992 statement 
by Richard C. Holbrooke (who soon after became Assistant Secretary of 
State in the Clinton administration): 
A new principle of international relations is arising: the destruction or 
displacement of groups of people within states justifi es international 
intervention. A new balance must be struck between traditional sov-
ereignty and the world community’s interest in human rights.45 
In the former Yugoslavia, the intervention scheme has taken a fur-
ther step since the recommendation of NATO air strikes without prior UN 
Security Council authorisation signifi cantly challenged the established 
42  Jonathan I Charney, ‘NATO’s  Kosovo Intervention: Anticipatory Humanitarian Interven-
tion in Kosovo’ (1999)  93 (4) AJIL 834, 836.
43  NATO, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and 
the Russian Federation , Paris, 27 May 1997.
44  See Fernando R Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law and Morality 
(Dobbs Ferry, New York 1988).
45  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace National Commission, Changing Our Ways: 
America and the New World (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC 
1992) 51.
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international legal order.46 The NATO response ranked the principles of 
humanitarian intervention above the norms of state sovereignty (accord-
ing to UN Charter Article 2(4): ‘All members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any state’). Even though NATO practice 
seems to advocate that a regional organisation rather than the Security 
Council may be the fi nal arbiter, such a position is highly debatable. 
The validity of the NATO actions, a question put before the International 
Court of Justice in the Hague,47 depends on whether the danger was real 
and immediate and there were no other ways to avert the danger (Cus-
tomary International Right of Self-Preservation). Even though the weakest 
point for the human rights cause pursued by NATO is the lack of UN ex-
press acknowledgment, it is not clear that the non-intervention and sov-
ereignty principle will gain support in the Hague proceedings. It might be 
advocated that the UN Charter Article 2(4) is vested in law-abiding states 
only, cf the Corfu Channel Case stating that elementary considerations 
of humanity are among the general and recognised principles of inter-
national law.48 The UN Charter’s protection of sovereignty requests that 
such elementary considerations are defended by UN Member States. 
An additional argument is that the military mission was not contrary 
to any decision made either by the Security Council or the General As-
sembly. Some would probably say that the Security Council, in demanding 
ceasefi res and the termination of criminal acts, created an opening for mil-
itary action. The UN, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, stated in a 1998 resolution on Kosovo that the Security Council: 
Decides, should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution 
and resolution 1160 (1998) not be taken, to consider further action 
and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability 
in the region.49
This strong concern was further expressed later that year:
Deeply alarmed and concerned at the continuing grave humanitar-
ian situation throughout Kosovo and the impending humanitarian 
catastrophe, and re-emphasizing the need to prevent this from hap-
pening.50 
46  The inherent right is an alternative to codifi ed law, see Ørebech (n 6) 7.
47  See ICJ Order (n 35). The court had earlier rejected by clear majorities to give intermedi-
ate relief in favour of Yugoslavia. See the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision of  2 
June 1999, requests fi led by Yugoslavia against ten NATO member states on 29 April 1999, 
asking the ICJ to order the NATO members to ‘cease immediately [their] acts of use of force’ 
and to ‘refrain from any act of threat or use of force’ against Yugoslavia.
48 ICJ (1949) 22.
49 UN Doc (September 23, 1998) S/RES/1199, emphasis added. 
50 Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998) on the situation in Kosovo, UN Doc. S/
RES/1203.
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But such strong expressions of concern did not stop Serbian atroci-
ties. Was military action the only ‘further action and additional measures’ 
left (see UN Charter 42)? Since the ICJ found valid the US reservations to 
the court’s jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention that Yugoslavia 
accused the US of breaching,51 the ICJ dismissed the case, and we will 
thus not know the answer to that question. 
One line of argument goes as follows: during the NATO bombing op-
erations in Serbia, the Security Council, at its Kosovo meeting of 14 May 
1999, did not ban the NATO mission.52 And in that connection, Yugosla-
via itself has clearly documented ‘ethnic cleansing,’ genocide, and other 
atrocities in Kosovo.53 It is diffi cult to say what the court ruling would 
have been.54  
Postscript 
Dangerous Diplomacy illustrates why freedom of speech, a free press, 
critical opposition and self-reliant citizens with no fear of the high and 
mighty are the alpha & omega of all societies (p 262). Even though some 
success is achieved in creating human rights institutions, we still need 
the ‘righteous’ to prevent human rights abuses on a daily basis. Preven-
tive diplomacy ex ante by implemented internalised human rights protec-
tion is clearly preferable ex post facto to military protective diplomacy. 
Enjoying, for the fi rst time in history, strong support from the in-
ternational society of states, righteous individuals have a supportive en-
vironment that may encourage the human rights cause.  Theo Tschuy’s 
book deftly illustrates how righteous human morals have evolved into le-
gal obligations, and shows why human rights issues have become fi rmly 
entrenched in political life worldwide. 
51  Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. US) (June 2 1999) ICJ 916.
52   Security Council Resolution 1239 (1999) on Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 
1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998), UN Doc. S/RES/1239. 
53 OSCE, ‘Kosovo/Kosova, As Seen, As Told: An Analysis of the Human Rights Find-
ings of the OSCE Kosovo Verifi cation Mission October 1998 to June 1999’.
54  Quite a few legal scientists object to the validity of the intervention. See Dale Carson, 
‘Contemporary International Law Issues: The Kosovo Question’ (2000) 2 Florida Coastal 
Law Journal 167, with further references. A more positive attitude to the NATO mission is 
found in Charney (n 42).  
